
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PREFACE

This bibliography provides selective annotations of opensource material on three current Indochina-related issues:

- * Thailand's political strategy for solving the Cambodian question
- * tactics and organization of Khmer/Laotian resistance groups
- * the war in Cambodia

This bibliography incorporates serials and monographs received in the previous month and is part of a continuing series on the above subjects.

Entries are arranged alphabetically by author or title.

Library of Congress call numbers, where appropriate, are included to facilitate the recovery of works cited.

GLOSSARY

Armee Nationale Sihanoukiste ANS (Sihanoukist National Army) Association of Southeast Asian **ASEAN** Nations Coalition Government of Democratic **CGDK** Kampuchea Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge) DK National United Front for an FUNCINPEC Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia Khmer Communist Party KCP Khmer People's National Liberation KPNLF Front (Son Sann) Khmer People's Revolutionary Armed **KPRAF** Forces Khmer Rouge (Pol Pot) KR Khmer United Front for National KUFNCD Construction and Defense (PRK) Progressive [lit: moving in new Naeo Na directionsl People's Army of Vietnam PAVN Provisional Central Committee for PCCS Salvation (KPNLF) Permanent Military Committee for PERMICO Coordination (KPNLF and ANS) People's Republic of Kampuchea PRK

Royal Thai Government

People's Revolutionary Party of

Kampuchea, aka KPRP (Khmer People's Revolutionary Party)

PRPK

RTG

Siam Rat

Thai Nation

SPK

News Agency of the PRK

· SRV

Socialist Republic of Vietnam

Su Anakhot

Forward [lit: going toward the
future]

1. THAILAND'S POLITICAL STRATEGY FOR SOLVING THE CAMBODIAN QUESTION

"Border Flexibility." <u>Far Eastern Economic Review</u> (Hong Kong), vol. 131, no. 3, 15 March 1986, p. 11. HC 411 F18

Thai security forces agree to allow Vietnamese troops a 2-km leeway before retaliating if they breach certain parts of the Thai-Cambodian border during the current dry season.

"SRV Troops at Cambodian Border Announce 5 Demands." <u>Matichon</u> (Bangkok), 12 March 1986, p. 3. In FBIS (Asia & Pacific), 13 March 1986, p. Jl.

On 10 March, Vietnamese soldiers at border marker 44 along the Thai-Cambodian border used a megaphone to read out the following five demands on Thailand: 1) Thailand must not provide support or shelter for the Cambodian resistance. 2) Thailand must not conduct ground or air patrols along the border. 3) Thailand must not give food to the three Cambodian resistance groups. 4) Thailand must be held completely responsible for any border incidents between Vietnamese and Thai troops. 5) Thailand must realize that the areas where Vietnamese soldiers are present are the areas delineating the border between Cambodia and Thailand. Col. Prasat Thaenkham, deputy commander of the Thai Burapha Force, tells reporters that Vietnam has no right to give such an order. Reporters also learned that Vietnamese soldiers delivered a letter addressed to the commander of Thai forces along the border but its contents were not revealed.

| 2. | TACTICS | AMD | ORGANIZATION | OF | KHMER | /LAOTTAN | RESISTANCE | GROUPS |
|----|---------|-----|--------------|----|-------|--|------------|----------|
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"Another Rift in Resistance Ranks." <u>Asiaweek</u> (Hong Kong), vol. 12, no. 9, 23 February 1986, p. 22. DS1.A715

In addition to the feud dividing the KPNLF there are reports that a shake-up occurred in the top echelons of the Sihanoukist front. Gen. Teap Ben, commander-in-chief and chief of staff of the ANS, lost both posts to Sihanouk's son, Norodom Ranariddh. The changeover apparently came about on the orders of Sihanouk himself, who related that Ranariddh and Teap Ben had not been on good terms for several months. A major complaint against Teap Ben was the disappearance of funds entrusted to him by Sihanouk for distribution to soldier's widows.

"Cambodian Guerrillas Report Killing 200 Vietnam Troops." New York Times, 9 March 1986, p. A5.

Khmer Rouge radio, monitored in Bangkok, reports that Khmer Rouge guerrillas killed 200 Vietnamese soldiers and wounded 150 others in a raid on a town near Phnom Penh.

"Cambodian Rebels Offer a Plan for Peace." New York Times, 18 March 1986, p. A5.

The CGDK offers a peace plan calling for a partnership with the Hanoi-backed Cambodian Government and the gradual withdrawal of Vietnamese troops under a UN-supervised cease-fire. The proposal marks the first time Prince Sihanouk and his two coalition partners formally have offered to form a government with the Vietnamese-installed Government of Heng Samrin.

"Khmer Rouge Guerrillas Back Prince Against Hanoi." <u>Christian</u>
<u>Science Monitor</u> (Boston), 14 February 1986, p. 2.

The Khmer Rouge pledges allegiance to Prince Sihanouk despite reports that they recently attacked the Prince's military forces. Khmer Rouge radio reports that leaders of the group met and unanimously agreed that Sihanouk should stay on as president of the CGDK.

"Letter Writer Describes Conflicts in Coalition." <u>The Nation</u> (Bangkok), 24 January 1986, p. 5. In JPRS-SEA-86-031, 19 February 1986, pp. 132, 133.

A Cambodian expatriate writing from Australia rates Son Sann as inadequate for the requirements of the "common nationalist cause of the Cambodian people." He states that Cambodians see Son Sann's KPNLF as a business organization rather than a "nationalist organization," and Son Sann as a non contributor to the nationalist spirit. On the contrary, Son Sann is observed to spend most of his time "directly competing [with] and insulting his partners in the Coalition."

Mullin, Chris. "The Acceptable Face of Military Muscle."

<u>Guardian</u> (Manchester), 28 February 1986, p. 13.

In an article briefly describing the Cambodian situation, the reporter writes that in private everyone concedes that the only viable alternative to the Vietnamese-backed Heng Samrin government is the Khmer Rouge. Yet, with the exception of China, nobody wants to be seen talking to them. Attempts by the Khmer Rouge to clean up their image are clouded by the stark reality of the border, where civilians in Khmer Rouge-run camps appear to be there against their will and KPNLF and ANS forces have been attacked by their Khmer Rouge allies. All of this is apparently tolerated by Khmer Rouge supporters because of the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. Yet, the author points out, a Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia could prove embarrassing to Khmer Rouge backers because their object of support would in all likelihood be returned to power at that point without significant motivation to alter its former policies.

"Prince Ranariddh to Give up ANS Military Post." <u>The Nation</u>
(Bangkok), 1 March 1986, p. 5. In FBIS (Asia & Pacific), 5
March 1986, p. H2.

The top military commander of the ANS, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, will soon give up one of his military posts to reduce his workload. It is reported that he has decided to

give up his chief of staff post and to set up a committee consisting of 11 Sihanoukist generals to assist him as commander in chief. The prince's decision to relinquish his post comes amid rumors concerning a rift between him and ANS top general, Teap Ben, which the prince denies.

"Son Sann to Discuss KPNLF Troubles With Sihanouk." The Nation (Bangkok), 6 March 1986, p. 1. In FBIS (Asia & Pacific), 10 March 1986, pp. H6, H7.

KPNLF leader Son Sann is reported to be planning a visit soon to Beijing to meet with Prince Sihanouk. Sihanouk has already received a leading member of the dissident faction in Son Sann's party, Thon Ouk, a former cabinet member, who explained to Sihanouk the position of the dissident faction.

Tasker, Rodney. "Up Against the Odds." <u>Far Eastern Economic Review</u> (Hong Kong), vol. 131, no. 3, 16 January 1986, pp 22, 23. HC 411 F18

The rift in the leadership of the KPNLF has deteriorated into an open war of words between the two factions, with the odds seemingly more and more against Son Sann. The rebels declared on 2 January that they were in full control of the front's military and civilian administration, while an embarrassed Son Sann had to admit publicly that he was being blocked from visiting his troops and civilian population on the Thai-Cambodian border. Most observers are wondering about Son Sann's future. Even if a settlement is reached, it seems the main condition will be that Son Bann remain only as an honorary president of the front, with real power in the hands of his current adversaries.

"The Row Stops Here." <u>Far Eastern Economic Review</u> (Hong Kong), vol. 131, no. 8, 20 February 1986, p. 9. HC 411 F18

Far Eastern Economic Review reports that despite the internal bickering that is wracking the KPNLF over the question of coordination with the ANS, led by Prince Sihanouk, unity is being cemented in Washington, where the organizations plan to open a joint information office.